On April 14, 1970, fifty-five hours and fifty-four minutes into the mission, at
\n03:08 universal time, a damaged electrical cable caused an explosion in one of
\nthe oxygen tanks, which led James Lovell to send back to Earth the famous, al-
\nbeit frequently misquoted, message \u201cHouston, we\u2019ve had a problem.\u201d The
\nexplosion resulted in a dramatic series of consequences that not only put an
\nimmediate end to their chances of landing on the Moon, but also put the abil-
\nity of the crew to return safely in jeopardy. The story of the following eighty-
\nseven hours became one of the most fascinating rescue missions in human
\nhistory, and it remains a superb example of a practical application of an inquiry
\napproach.
\nThe mission director, Gene Kranz, was in the Mission Operations Control
\nRoom in Houston when those on the ground heard Lovell\u2019s fateful words. Im-
\nmediately after receiving the information about the problems onboard, the
\nleader of Apollo 13 clarified that the explosion had caused the craft to lose
\npower on the main B bus, one of the two main electrical circuits onboard. A
\nmoment later the telemetry came back on, and on Earth, a steady flow of au-
\ntomatically generated reports of new malfunctions began arriving: two of the
\nthree fuel cells failed, one of the oxygen tanks was completely destroyed, and
\nthe pressure was rapidly dropping in the other.<\/p>\n
The scale of the problems was difficult to imagine. Seymour Liebergot, the mission\u2019s EECOM (Electrical, Environmental, and
\nConsumables Manager), said in an interview that \u201cIt was not a single or a dou-
\nble or a triple failure I was looking at. It was a quadruple failure. That was
\nimpossible, it just couldn\u2019t happen on that craft,\u201d \u2077 thus classifying the situ-
\nation as a black swan. Of course, there was no way the mission could con-
\ntinue, and instead the battle to save the crew began.
\nApollo 13 was composed of two independent craft: a command module
\n(CSM), connected to the service module where the explosion occurred, and a
\nlunar module (LM), named Aquarius. Kranz\u2019s team, analyzing the possible sce-
\nnarios, very quickly came to the conclusion that, as a result of the damage sus-
\ntained by the command module, the only way to save the crew was to use the
\nLM as a life boat. The LM was equipped with its own power source, as well as
\noxygen tanks independent of the command module and life support systems
\nfor the crew. Houston therefore ordered the astronauts to get into the landing
\nmodule and to switch off the power in the command module to save power for
\nthe return journey\u2014the CSM was the only part of Apollo 13 suited to enter Earth-
\n\u2019s atmosphere. If the command module totally ran out of power in the ensuing
\nhours, or if it mechanically failed, the crew would have no chance.
\nKranz\u2019s team were faced with making another key decision: how to get the
\nseriously damaged spacecraft to Earth. When Apollo 13 hit problems, it was al-
\nmost 200,000 miles from Earth and almost 43,000 miles from the Moon.
\nHouston\u2019s challenge was how to plan a flight trajectory when the shortest
\nroute (i.e., turning the spacecraft round using its rockets) wasn\u2019t necessarily
\nthe best. First of all, it meant dumping the LM; secondly, there was a risk that
\nthe command module engine wouldn\u2019t work, as it was beside the site of the
\nexplosion. Neither the crew nor mission control had reliable information about
\nthe condition of the rocket, so if the CSM turned out to be inoperable after the
\nlunar module was dumped, the crew would be certain to die. A second option,
\nwhich involved continuing the flight toward the Moon, seemed utterly absurd,
\nbut only at first glance. In this scenario, NASA planned to use the Moon\u2019s grav-
\nity to jump-start Apollo 13 and to turn it around and send it on its way home.
\nThe spacecraft would have to make a controlled flight around the Moon and
\nthen, after a brief blast of the engines, head back to Earth. Two pluses of that
\noption were that it allowed for some emergency alternatives if the engine in the
\ncommand module failed and it saved fuel; a minus was that it significantly ex-
\ntended the timeline of the whole operation\u2014according to the estimates of
\nKranz\u2019s team, it would take about forty-eight hours more than the direct return
\noption, which in light of the meager supplies of oxygen in the lander consti-
\ntuted a genuine risk to the astronauts\u2019 lives. A further minus was that this sce-
\nnario also required those involved to work out a set of totally original solutions
\nand take absolutely nonstandard, previously untested actions.
\nKranz brought all the mission control staff together in the main hall and
\nspoke the words that have passed into history as an example of authentic lead-
\nership in crisis conditions, at the same time providing a superb example of
\ninitiating an inquiry process:<\/p>\n
Okay, team, we have a hell of a problem. There has been some type of explo-
\nsion on board the spacecraft. We still don\u2019t know what happened. We are on
\nthe long return around the Moon and it is our job to find out how to get
\nthem home. [… ] The odds are damned long, but we\u2019re damned good.<\/p>\n
He then named his team leads and gave a detailed breakdown of what he ex-
\npected of everyone involved\u2014making clear that communication across the
\nboard was crucial to success, that instructions from the team leads were to be
\nfollowed to the letter, and that if anyone felt they were not the right person for a
\ntask assigned to them, they should suggest someone more suitable. His clos-
\ning words were nothing short of inspirational:<\/p>\n
Okay, listen up. When you leave this room, you must leave believing that this
\ncrew is coming home. I don\u2019t give a damn about the odds and I don\u2019t give a damn that we\u2019ve never done anything like this before. Flight control will never
\nlose an American in space. You\u2019ve got to believe, your people have got to be-
\nlieve, that this crew is coming home. Now let\u2019s get going!<\/p>\n
Kranz was in an extremely difficult situation\u2014he had to balance the de-
\nmands of two opposing forces. On the one hand, as he was dealing with a
\nblack swan, it was essential to carry out the most thorough and detailed anal-
\nysis of the data possible, and to then generate the maximum number of poten-
\ntial scenarios. On the other hand, time was of the essence, as every second
\nthat passed sucked up the dwindling oxygen supplies.<\/p>\n
Stuck in this dichotomy, Kranz was nonetheless certain about a few points.
\nHe knew that this was a mission impossible\u2014a rescue operation without par-
\nallel in human history. He also knew that any error would be fatal, so he had to
\nmake use of every available second to check the data he was going to have to
\nbase his decision on. He knew that without involving a broad group of experts
\nin the discussion, from both within NASA and outside the organization, he
\nwould have no chance of saving Apollo 13 and its crew. He knew that although
\nthe final decision was his to make, success hinged on very precisely defining
\nthe responsibilities of the key personnel in the decision-making process and
\ninvolving them every step of the way.<\/p>\n
He was also aware that there wasn\u2019t enough time, resources were limited,
\nand there was absolutely no margin for error.
\nKranz recognized that it was fundamental that he involve the largest possible
\nnumber of experts, from the widest possible range of fields in an open discus-
\nsion. Every second had to be dedicated to understanding the essence of the
\nproblems Houston was struggling with and to generate the maximum number
\nof action scenarios to then be further tested and analyzed. The team instantly
\nabandoned any options that had even a whiff of not being implementable in
\nthe time available. All work was constantly checked by the designated leaders,
\nArnold Aldrich, John Aaron, and William Peters, so that the solutions chosen<\/p>\n
didn\u2019t threaten to waste the time available for the critical resources on the
\nspacecraft and the entire operation.
\nLater, Kranz explained that by creating an environment in which everyone be-
\nlieved in their collective ability to save the crew and felt able to speak out for
\nthe greater good without worrying about the reactions of their colleagues, the
\nteam was able to push forward and focus solely on addressing the crisis.<\/p>\n
With a team working in this fashion, not concerned with voicing their opin-
\nions freely and without worrying about hurting anyone\u2019s feelings, we saved
\ntime. Everyone became a part of the solution. \u2079<\/p>\n
Kranz\u2019s instant decision to deepen the inquiry approach meant inviting engi-
\nneers from NASA\u2019s subcontractors to join the discussions\u2014the Apollo pro-
\ngram was carried out by over five hundred companies, which were responsible
\nfor designing and manufacturing various elements of the craft. Among the
\nmost important subcontractors were MIT\u2019s Draper Labs, Grumman Aerospace
\nCorporation, and North American Rockwell, whose experts were literally pulled
\nfrom their beds and catapulted into the work for Kranz\u2019s team. They had to
\ndeal with a range of doubts and questions that they had never previously en-
\ncountered.
\nThe problems with the engines on Apollo 13 required switching off all the
\nspacecraft\u2019s systems until it was time to prepare for re-entry. That gave them a
\nchance of saving the energy that would be required later. The navigational sys-
\ntem used the most energy onboard, being essential for the proper adminis-
\ntration of all maneuvers during the mission and while landing, making it the
\nprime candidate to be switched off. However, the engineers from Draper Labs,
\nwho built the system, were concerned because no one had ever powered down
\nand then restarted the equipment during a flight. The matter was escalated, and
\na row, albeit a highly constructive one, broke out among the most important
\npersonnel. They debated the facts and concrete data that made it clear that
\nleaving the navigational system powered on meant that the electrics would
\nsurely fail before the crew made it back home. If they turned the navigation off,
\nhowever, there was no guarantee that they would be able to restart it success-
\nfully, and without it, there would be no return trip. After lengthy analysis and
\ntesting, a surprising solution was put forward: leave the navigation on, but turn
\noff the heating and lighting in the module the astronauts were in, which meant
\na drastic reduction in the temperature inside the Apollo 13 capsule. The idea
\nwas put into action, and from that moment on the crew continued the flight in
\ndarkness and bitter cold, which was an enormous test of their physical and
\nmental endurance.
\nAnother black swan dealt with in inquiry mode was the matter of the carbon
\ndioxide filters onboard the craft. Increasing concentrations of carbon dioxide
\nduring a mission was a relatively routine occurrence, and there were two dis-
\ntinctive square filters, like two large boxes, for cleaning the air on the com-
\nmand module. The unexpected problem stemmed from the crew\u2019s being in the
\nlanding module, which enriched the air using its own filters\u2014which were
\ncylindrical. Typical air use in the LM was meant to be at much lower levels
\n(only two people, not three, and for two days, not four), so there were no spare
\nfilters, and it rapidly became clear that if they didn\u2019t change the filters, the crew
\nwould slowly suffocate. In an unfortunate twist on the old adage about trying
\nto fit a square peg into a round hole, they were faced with trying to make the
\navailable square filters fit the canister sockets in the landing module, which
\ncould only take round filters. And as if that weren\u2019t enough, they had to do it
\nonly using objects already on Apollo 13 and that weren\u2019t required for any other
\nvital tasks. After a whole night of fevered work and endless brainstorming, Ed
\nSmylie\u2019s team in the Johnson Space Center discovered they could use the card-
\nboard covers of the pilot\u2019s manual, some plastic bags, a piece of tubing bor-
\nrowed from a spare space suit, and large amounts of gaffer tape. Transmitting
\nthe idea to Apollo 13 was no easy task in itself, and the crew needed to use a
\ngreat deal of spatial imagination. The solution worked, though, and two hours
\nlater, the concentration of carbon dioxide in the landing module started falling
\nback to safe levels.
\nAll these actions, though, didn\u2019t solve the fundamental dilemma of the in-
\ncreased flight time leading to the power supplies and oxygen running out. Mis-
\nsion Control therefore decided to switch on the module\u2019s engines, so as to in-
\ncrease Apollo\u2019s speed and reduce the return trip by about ten hours. This deci-
\nsion also came at a cost. Re-entering Earth\u2019s atmosphere in a craft hurtling
\nalong at over 25,000 miles an hour was an operation requiring almost surgical
\nprecision. The tiniest error could have catastrophic consequences. If they re-
\nentered at too shallow an angle, the module would bounce off the outer layers
\nof the atmosphere, like a skipping stone off water. Too steep an angle would
\nlead to a sudden slowing and the capsule burning up. The safe zone was barely
\n2 degrees across, which\u2014bearing in mind the massive speed and the still un-
\nknown levels of damage sustained by the CSM\u2014posed an extraordinarily diffi-
\ncult challenge.
\nBefore powering up again and starting the re-entry maneuver, the entire
\nprocedure was analyzed for hours and simulated on Earth, with the backup
\ncrew of Apollo 13 playing an essential role in the process. The final checklist
\ncontained over four hundred steps and ran to thirty-nine pages. The job of
\ntransmitting it to the CSM fell to Joseph Kerwin, the communications officer,
\nwho was supervised throughout by the entire team, including Arnold Aldrich.
\nDictating the checklist took over two hours, and Jack Swigert used up, among
\nother things, every single cover from the onboard manuals to write it all down.
\nOn April 17, 1970, the crew managed to restore the power on the CSM and
\nthe three astronauts left Aquarius to prepare for splashdown. At 1:40 pm, 138
\nhours after liftoff, the crew detached the service module in which the explosion
\nhad taken place from the command module. Photos of the ditched section,
\nwhich were sent to Houston, showed massive damage, arousing fears about
\nthe state of the command module itself. If its outer surface had been even
\nslightly damaged in the explosion, the CSM would never survive re-entry. Three
\nand a half hours later, it was time to say farewell to the LM. The lander was
\ndetached and Apollo 13 began its final, decisive maneuver.
\nThe most stressful time in mission control is the blackout, the period in
\nwhich there is silence as the capsule passes through the upper layers of the
\natmosphere. In these minutes there is no contact between the astronauts and
\nmission control, and no data from the onboard instruments get through. In
\nthis case, the blackout lasted three minutes. What it was like in the Mission
\nOperations Control Room during that period is best expressed by Gene Kranz:<\/p>\n
Everything now was irreversible. [… ] The control room was absolutely silent.
\n[… ] All eyes were on the clocks counting down to the end of blackout. Black-
\nout was an eternity. [… ] Quietly, in hushed tones, I called Deiterich, my
\nRETRO: \u201cChuck, were the clocks good?\u201d In a whisper he responded, \u201cThey\u2019re
\ngood, Flight.\u201d We waited. The world waited. We were 1:28 past the expected
\nacquisition time when a crackly report from a downrange aircraft broke the
\ntension: \u201cARIA4 has acquisition.\u201d I pounded the edge of the console; the
\nroom erupted [… ] Kerwin called again and a few seconds later we heard,
\n\u201cOkay Joe.\u201d Just two words, but the intensity of the relief was overwhelming.
\nIn the control room, each controller has his moment of emotional climax. […
\n] I was standing at the console crying. \u00b9\u2070<\/p>\n
For his achievement, Gene Kranz received the Presidential Medal of Free-
\ndom, and in the months that followed, he and the other heroes of the rescue
\nmission became celebrities and the story of Apollo 13 became a synonym for
\nsuccessful completion of a \u201cmission impossible.\u201d
\nKranz\u2019s team\u2019s working methods are still held up as a model application of
\nthe inquiry mode in practice. The Herculean engagement of all those involved
\nin the operation and their unshakeable faith that it would succeed are also seen
\nas a model for best practices in such circumstances.
\nGene Kranz worked for NASA until he retired in 1994. That same year, he
\ntook part in the documentary film Apollo 13: To the Edge and Back. When he began describing the mission\u2019s final minutes, he was unable to hold back the
\ntears, despite the dramatic events having unfolded over a quarter of a century
\nbefore. The scene survived the cutting room and is part of the final film.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
LABYRINTH: THE ART OF DECISION – MAKING<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n PAWEL MOTYL<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" On April 14, 1970, fifty-five hours and fifty-four minutes into the mission, at 03:08 universal time, a damaged electrical cable caused an explosion in one of the oxygen tanks, which led James Lovell to send back to Earth the famous, al- beit frequently misquoted, 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April 14, 1970, fifty-five hours and fifty-four minutes into the mission, at 03:08 universal time, a damaged electrical cable caused an explosion in one of the oxygen tanks, which led James Lovell to send back to Earth the famous, al- beit frequently misquoted, 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